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Abstract
The paper sets up a heterogeneous, overlapping, and general equilibrium
bequest model incorporating estate taxation to examine the redistribution
effect of estate tax. In the part of individual’s lifetime decision, three kinds
of bequest motives are considered, that is selfishness, altruism and exchange.
The main finding is that the effects of estate tax on the distribution of dispos-
able lifetime income depend on transfer motives. However, the quality results
all point to the unfavorable effect of the imposition of estate tax on distribu-
tion inequality. The paper also reveals that in the exchange framework, the
redistribution effect of estate tax is minor, if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is large enough.
Keywords: bequest motives, estate tax, income inequality
1. ‡k
³ß˘í{âV˛˝, 9w‡„{7; 3"{6‰Ïwx‹ó½}ºíŠ
?, ¥ú6†wÑw{„lz, ó’…Ú	D%ÈAÅ Ék³ß˘í{úlzW
ÑD’…$Aí	à, ÅÕd.Ö«n jÖb!Df$íhõø_, Eý
¶}Mæ‡, wÈíÏÄAk³œícq.°, Ì5?ú§6í%ÈWÑ
5	à, J£˘YíT} Bk{³ß˘ú}ºí	à, d.ýÍ$í«n,
/õ¶.ø Wà, Jantscher (1977) ¹!k³ß˘íÌ“^‹73"{ Í7,
Stiglitz (1978)ºT|³ß˘‹½F).Ìíª?, Üâú: íl, à‹{³ß
˘U)lzÁý,†’…Áý¨A	’-±,F)Áý,.ÌÄ7,¯ wŸ,‹
óíúïu°ø0Hí¤˚6, †{˘ø=U}ºy‹.Ì y6, à‹‚í³
Ê^äÞ?‰í.—, †{˘‘ø‹½FHí}º.Ì Î¤5Õ, ¡‚ Lainter
(2001) Jø_‚FíFHøOÌ©_, _ÒÌ{³ß˘í‹ó}º, !‹éý
¦¾³ß˘øU‹ó}ºÕ2“
Åq¡…î¦¾³ß˘5‡,9¥ú;¨5‡ú¤ø‡æ, ÅqþˇÃ
ãíÜ}&Dû˝, 6àrpœ (2001) [JvõÒüÑ³ß˘6´§Ab
íªW, ÀR³ß˘Ì‹óíTà ¡k¤, ³WÑ •˘D}ºí
É©, WJð³ß˘í½}º^‹, 4…díû˝3ð
yà,H, {³ß˘úlz ³J£}ºí	à, D³íœl×íÉ
[ Gale and Perozek (2001) {‚àFHí_, }&ªœÊA‚ ‚FD>
qúG-, {³ß˘úùHlzí	à, !‹óç}t à‹,øHuA‚í,
†{³ß˘ú,øHlzWÑí	àe˘YíT}7ì, 7-øHílzÌàS





_ wø, ÊA‚íÞ·U‚_ (Levhari and Mirman (1977), Davis (1981)),
AbJ³ß, 6u|kXÍ âk\ÔÒ.Ur, AbÌ¶ø‹óÀ“, ]Ñd
fêÔ7M’ß ¥<’ßª?ÊFA.£¾‘êí8”-, AÑ-øHí<Õ
5‹ wù, Ê‚F_ (Barro (1974), Becker (1974, 1991), Becker and Tomes
(1979)), ‚í^àÎ7VAkA™í¾‘Õ, 6DäÞí^àóÉ, ]‚ø
‹ó8äÞ wú, Ê>q_ (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Cox (1987), Bern-
heim, Shleiferand and Summers (1985)), ‚J³²¦äÞíÉ-DÎe®




í‹óDF)}º Ä5, …û˝ø;WA‚ ‚FD>qú³œ, }ZÜ




_ Ê•˘„jÞ, cq\ú‹’D‚7F){˘, °v6ú³ß£D{˘;
ù6îÑªW˘ {˘íñícÊ½}º ¡Î Caballe´ (1995), cq\‚à˘Y
TXtu‹, 7tu‹C.	à_Aí^à, C6u^àƒbí‹á
2.1 _Aí%È²µ
íl, Ê_A²µ¶}, cq_AíÞ·ª}Aù_¼¨, ø¼¨©_A	T Þ>
¾‘Dlz, ù¼¨†ªp¢*‚ Ñ“}&, cq_AíX#uÌ 4í,





¢*‚‡AøÞúÞ·í.üì4, I pt H[ t HíÞæœ0; cq®0HíÞæ
œ0ó°, ¹ pt = p Ä¤, à‹‚Êù‚Eæº, †äÞ³Y§‚íLS³
; à‹‚Êø‚!!¹ 0, †äÞ<Õí³
2
I c1t D c2t }H[ t H‚ù‚í¾‘, st uwlz, lzí˘(„Ñ{0
u R∗t+1 wF)VÄ2, F)²ìk’˙?‰ (at) DÒ´	’0 (w
∗
t ) cq
F)˘˘0	ìÑ τ , ³˘˘0	ìÑ τb R
∗
t+1 = (1− τ)Rt+1, w∗t = (1− τ)wt,
w2 Rt+1 D wt }u’…˘‡í„Ñ{0D˘‡	’0 ¢cq°ø0Hí’˙











































2t = 1 ®‚¾‘´™´F)íª0§’…˘‡í„Ñ{0 F)˘0D
ù‚æº0í	à à‹F‚íH 4×kø (γ < 1), †’…˘‡í„Ñ{0B
òCF)˘˘0BQ, ø‚í¾‘Bý, ù‚í¾‘BÖ ¤Õ, ù‚íæº0
Bò, ø‚í¾‘Bý, ù‚í¾‘BÖ
B. ‚F
cqúäÞíDòQ#‚^à (Andereoni (1990)), J θa [ýäÞY§í





































































à‹F‚íH 4×kø, †’…˘‡í„Ñ{0Bò (CF)˘0BQ), ø‚
í¾‘ª0BQ, ù‚í¾‘ª0Dª0Bò ¤Õ, ‚í‚F˙Bò, 
ª0Bò, 7‚A™ù‚¾‘íª0BQ
C. >q
cq‚Ñ¦)äÞÊù‚íÎe, wÛDäÞ Ä¤, ‚ø‚ílzÎ7
Xù‚í¾‘Õ, ÿu˛äÞí (Zt) óúí, äÞÊø‚Î7ÊÒÿ























cJ Zt > 0, †‚ù‚í¾‘DúäÞí}Ñ




2, ρt = ((θ
e)1/γP
γ−1/γ

























Ê¤_2, ù‚í¾‘Dú-øHí·u™´F)íøìMç, ¹ c1t =
αe1ty
∗




































(1− ρt)R∗t+1 + (R∗t+1)1/γ
. (15)
Ê>qœ-, ‚ù‚í¾‘ª0Dª0°š§ƒ’…˘‡í„Ñ{0DF)
˘0í	à F.°íu, F)˘0Î7Z‰F‚í¾‘²ÏÕ, 6	àäÞíg
 Ê>qœ-, ‚í¾‘ª06DäÞí	’0£D˘˘0É à‹F‚í
H 4×kø, äÞí	’0 (CD˘˘0) Bò, äÞígBò, *7
‚úøO¼¹í¾‘ª0Bò, úäÞíX|ª0BQ Î¤5Õ, ‚BÊ<ä
Þív, úäÞí¾‘X|ª0Bò
2.2 ÞßÞ







w2, ^ (effective labor) Lt = Na¯t, N u®0Hí‚A¨b Bk’…,










t−1, j = s, a, e. (17)
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τ R w Q K E(y∗) SCV (y∗)
(γ, θe, β, τb) = (0.4, 0.1, 0.3, 0)
0.4 1.460 0.355 25.374 5.212 0.110 0.311
0.3 1.267 0.378 26.970 6.387 0.136 0.317
0.2 1.117 0.398 28.462 7.643 0.163 0.320
0.1 0.998 0.418 29.866 8.974 0.191 0.323
τb R w Q K E(y
∗) SCV (y∗)
(γ, θe, β, τ) = (0.4, 0.1, 0.3, 0)
0.4 0.911 0.435 31.061 10.228 0.218 0.331
0.3 0.909 0.435 31.089 10.258 0.219 0.330
0.2 0.907 0.436 31.119 10.292 0.219 0.328
0.1 0.905 0.436 31.154 10.331 0.220 0.327
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